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Abstract
We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities
of players, who only observe the outcomes of their own matches. It is well known that coop-
eration can be sustained in equilibrium for the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) through grim trigger
strategies. Little is known about games beyond the PD. We study a new equilibrium concept,
strongly uniform equilibrium (SUE, which refines the notion of uniform equilibrium (UE) and
has additional properties such as a strong version of (approximate) sequential rationality. We
establish folk theorems for general games and arbitrary number of communities. Interestingly,
the equilibrium strategies we construct are easy to play. We extend the results to a setting with
imperfect private monitoring, for the case of two communities. We also show that it is possible
for some players to get equilibrium payoffs that are outside the set of individually rational and
feasible payoffs of the stage game. In particular, for the PD we derive a bound on the number of
“free-riders” that can be sustained in society. A by-product of our analysis is an important result
relating uniform equilibrium and strongly uniform equilibria: we show that, in general repeated
games with finite players, actions, and signals, the set of UE and SUE payoffs coincide.
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1 Introduction
We study the feasibility of cooperation in large communities, in which members of society interact
repeatedly over time. In large communities, players may not recognize each other, and often do not
observe everyone’s actions. For example, consider a large market in which people trade (bilaterally)
with strangers. The central question of this paper is whether people will cooperate or cheat in
such anonymous transactions. We model these interactions as an infinitely repeated anonymous
random matching game (RARMG) in which, in every period, players from different communities
are anonymously and randomly matched to each other to play a stage game. Each player observes
only the actions played in his own match: so he does not receive any information about the identity
of his opponents or about how the other players have been matched and what actions they have
played. We ask what payoffs can be achieved in equilibrium in RARMG.
Seminal papers by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) show that cooperation can be sustained
in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). This is done by way of community enforcement, which
means that desirable behavior or cooperation is sustained because deviating against one agent trig-
gers sanctions by others. Such an equilibrium, prescription of desirable behavior and appropriate
sanctions, is often interpreted as a social norm. How is such a social norm sustained by rational
agents? In the PD, if a player ever faces a defection, he punishes all future rivals by switching to de-
fection forever. After a defection, more and more people realize that there has been a deviation and
start defecting as well. This information spreads until, eventually, the whole population is defecting.
The credible threat of such a breakdown of cooperation can deter players from defecting in the first
place. Yet, the arguments in the aforementioned papers exploit the fact that, in the PD, the Nash
equilibrium of the stage-game is in strictly dominant actions. Thus, although punishing may lower
continuation payoffs, it always gives a short-term gain. In general games, it is harder to provide
incentives to “sanction” or punish, since doing so can both lower future continuation payoffs and
entail a short-term loss. An open question is whether cooperation can be sustained beyond the PD.
We establish several strong possibility results about cooperation in the RARMG environment.
Our main departure from existing literature lies in the solution concept, strongly uniform equilib-
rium, which we discuss in more detail below. We establish that given any stage game played by
any number of communities, it is possible to sustain any individually rational and feasible payoff in
a strongly uniform equilibrium. This is the first folk theorem in a RARMG environment, with no
non-trivial assumptions on stage-game payoffs and without adding any informational assumptions.1
1Deb and Gonza´lez-Dı´az (2013) establish a possibility result that applies to a relatively large class of two-player
games beyond the PD. Other papers that go beyond the PD introduce verifiable information about past play to sustain
cooperation. For instance, Kandori (1992) assumes the existence of a mechanism that assigns labels to players based on
their history of play: players who have deviated or have seen a deviation can be distinguished from those who have not,
by their labels. For related approaches, see Dal Bo´ (2007), Hasker (2007), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and
Takahashi (2010). More recently, Deb (2012) obtains a general folk theorem for any game by allowing cheap talk.
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We also obtain a folk theorem for the setting with two communities and imperfect private monitor-
ing within a match. Specifically, we consider a setting in which players do not perfectly observe
their rival’s action, but receive a noisy signal about it. We identify a mild sufficient condition on the
signal structure under which the folk theorem obtains.
Our analysis also leads to some qualitative observations about the payoffs that can be sustained
in equilibrium. First, we show that there can be players in the community who get equilibrium
payoffs that lie outside the set of individually rational and feasible payoffs of the stage game.2 We
do so by establishing a bound on the number of members of one community that can be “allowed”
to defect whilethe rest of society cooperates. We can interpret such an equilibrium as a social norm
that sustains a proportion of free riders in society. Second, we also investigate whether there is
room for using correlated punishments in our setting, presenting examples of equilibria in which
some members of society are held strictly below their independent minmax payoff.
A substantial part of the contribution of this paper lies in the equilibrium concept, strongly uni-
form equilibrium, a refinement of the notion of uniform equilibrium (Sorin, 1986; Fudenberg and
Levine, 1991) in which players’ strategies are uniformly approximate best responses to their rivals’
strategies and, moreover, have several extra features. One of them is a strong version of sequential
rationality after every history in which all the payoffs (including those after deviations) are obtained
almost surely and not just in expectation. Maybe more importantly, the equilibrium strategies we
construct are easy to play and, therefore, it is plausible to think that they can be followed by eco-
nomic agents.3 In a nutshell, the strategies consist of (1) cooperative blocks, where the players play
the actions that lead to the chosen target payoff, (2) testing phase, where, if needed, the players run
simple statistical tests to decide whether or not someone has deviated, and (3) punishment blocks,
to be played after a test has detected a deviation.4
Interestingly, we also make an important technical contribution to the literature on uniform
equilibrium in standard repeated games. We show that while strongly uniform equilibrium is a strict
refinement of uniform equilibrium in terms of strategies, the two solution concepts are identical in
terms of payoff sets. This result applies not just to our particular random matching environment,
but to any infinitely repeated game with general monitoring structure. An important consequence
is that, for any such game, any existing folk theorem or result obtained for the set of uniform
equilibrium payoffs immediately extends to the stronger notion of strongly uniform equilibrium,
i.e., the payoffs can also be sustained by strategies that satisfy several additional desirable features.
As a crucial tool to prove this and other results in this paper, we elaborate on a lemma by Lehrer
2Dal Bo´ (2007) makes a similar observation in a related setting.
3The strategies remain simple even in the case in which in addition to the highly imperfect private monitoring of the
standard RARMG setting we add imperfect private monitoring within a match.
4Note that, since in our setting there is no public signal, there is no room at all for the use of public strategies and,
hence, all the equilibria we obtain are in private strategies.
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(1990) and introduce a kind of “strategic” Tchebychev inequality, whose main role is to ensure that
punishments associated with the strategies we define, are effective not only in expectation, but also
almost surely.
Further, we show that defining strongly uniform equilibrium for discounted payoffs would lead
to a weaker equilibrium concept.5 Thus, the strength of our approach in establishing the folk the-
orems stems from the extra freedom given by epsilon-equilibria, and not from the choice of undis-
counted payoffs. It is worth noting that, if applied to a setting where discounted payoffs are con-
sidered, the strategies we construct have the important feature that they are robust to changes in the
discount factor and, indeed, apply even if players have different discount factors that are private in-
formation. Typically, these properties do not hold in equilibria obtained in the analysis of repeated
games with imperfect monitoring, where it is common that the strategies have to be tailored to
the (common) discount factor. Such robustness properties are particularly important in our setting,
where economic agents may not be very sophisticated.
It is well known that there is no hope of supporting the whole set of feasible and individually
rational payoffs under exact Nash equilibria in discounted games, not even under perfect monitoring
(see Forges et al. (1986) for a simple counter-example). Thus, a modification of the equilibrium
concept is needed to get positive results. In this sense, we establish that for RARMG, once we relax
the equilibrium notion to epsilon-Nash, we can impose additional requirements such as sequential
rationality, uniformity, stability, and robustness and still get folk theorems using simple strategies.
The use of epsilon-equilibria in the analysis of repeated interactions can be traced back to Rad-
ner (1980, 1981). We consider the setting of this paper to be specially appropriate for approximate
solution concepts. In the anonymous random matching setting, equilibrium behavior is typically
interpreted as a social norm. Research in anthropology and theoretical biology (e.g., Boyd and
Richerson (2002)) argues that the evolution of cooperation and punishment as social norms are
plausibly a side effect of a tendency of people to conform (adopt common behaviors). Group bene-
ficial social norms are sustained by the threat of punishment to violators. In turn, punishing violators
is sustained as normative behavior, because the relative disadvantage suffered by those who enforce
social norms compared with those who do not is small and easily balanced by even a weak tendency
to conform. Boyd and Richerson (2001), discuss the adaptive nature of social norms and hypoth-
esize that people deviate from the norm and adopt alternative behavior only if the payoff from
deviating is significantly higher. While we do not explicitly model the agent’s tendency to conform,
it provides a foundation for why approximate optimality is sensible for members in a community,
that is, players adhere to prescribed actions as long as they don’t foresee large gains from deviating.
We now elaborate a bit on the equilibrium strategies we construct. Consider a RARMG with two
communities. The strategies build on the idea of community enforcement, and we show cooperation
5A related analysis is also carried out in Fudenberg and Levine (1991).
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can be sustained via reversion to minmax punishments. The game is played in blocks of increasing
length. In each block, players play the action profiles that achieve the target payoff. If a player
observes a deviation, he switches to the minmax action till the end of the current block. At the start
of the new block, players “restart” by again playing the action profiles that sustain the target payoff.
Suppose a player plans to deviate at some period that is not near the end of a block. Regardless of
his continuation strategy, if the block length is large enough, from some point on, with probability
very close to 1, all players in the community would be playing the minmax action. After this, he
will be minmaxed for the remainder of the block. If the block is long enough, this future loss in
payoff will be larger than any gain he can make by deviating. Near the end of a block, a player might
have a strict incentive to deviate, but playing the prescribed equilibrium action is still approximately
optimal. Finally, concerning the incentives of a player who is supposed to punish a deviation, if he
is patient enough, it is approximately optimal for him to spend the current block disciplining those
who did not conform with the norm. As we mentioned above, the main challenge of extending this
construction for games with more than two communities is to ensure not only that deviations are
detected, but also that deviators are identified.
The use of block strategies to study uniform equilibria is not new. For instance, see the folk
theorem results in Lehrer (1990, 1992c), Fudenberg and Levine (1991), and Tomala (1999). When
trying to derive folk theorems, there are two main challenges: detecting deviations and identifying
the deviator.6 In the above papers these tasks are facilitated by imposing some structure on the
monitoring technology to facilitate detection and, for identification, either two player games are
considered or some restrictions are imposed on the set of achievable payoffs. In this paper we show
that, within the context of RARMG, folk theorems are possible under virtually no assumptions on
the stage game. In this literature it has also been common to assume that payoffs are observable, an
assumption that we do not need when we allow for imperfect private monitoring within a match.
The equilibrium strategies also have a desirable stability property. If we take the equilibrium to
be a positive description of play in large communities, it is reasonable to require that one mistake by
a single player does not destroy the social norm forever. Put differently, we would like social norms
to be “globally stable” in the sense that, after any finite history, play finally reverts to cooperative
play (Kandori, 1992). The equilibrium we construct has this feature, since equilibrium play involves
“restarting” the game at the start of each new block, regardless of the history.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3,
we present our solution concept and elaborate on its key properties. Section 4 contains the folk
theorems. Section 5 contains a discussion. The Appendix contains some technical proofs.
6The survey paper by Gossner and Tomala (2009) has a deep discussion on this and other challenges that have to be
solved in order to get folk theorems. Also the book by Mailath and Samuelson (2006) deeply discusses these issues in
the context of discounted payoffs.
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2 Model
2.1 Players, matching technology, actions, and strategies
There is a finite set of communities, denoted by C = {1, . . . , |C|}, each community with players
indexed by the set M = {1, . . . , |M |}. The set of players in society is denoted by N = C ×M .
Given a player i ∈ N , ic ∈ C denotes the community of player i. In each period t ∈ {1, 2, . . .},
the players are randomly matched to play a |C|-player stage game, where the role of each player is
given by the community he belongs to. A matching is a partition of the |C| × |M | players into |M |
groups of |C| players such that the players in each group play together the |C|-player stage game
and no two players in the same community are matched together. The matching is anonymous,
independent, and uniform over time.
In the stage game each community c ∈ C has a finite action set, Ac, with A =
∏
c∈C Ac
denoting the set of action profiles in the stage game between communities. We assume that each
community has at least two actions. Let Aˆ = AM denote the set of action profiles that can be played
at each stage of the random matching game. Given i ∈ N , let Ai = Aic and A−i =
∏
j∈C\{ic}Aj .
We denote mixed actions by si ∈ ∆(Ai) and correlated action profiles of players different from i
by s−i ∈ ∆(A−i). Given si ∈ ∆(Ai), s−i ∈ ∆(A−i), ai ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i, we let si(ai) and
s−i(a−i) denote the probabilities with which ai and a−i are chosen.
In the repeated game the players only observe the transactions they are personally engaged in. In
particular, a player gets no information about his opponents’ identities, or about how other players
have been matched, or about the actions chosen by any other group of players. Thus, for each t ≥ 0,
the set of personal period t histories is given by Ht = At, where A0 = {∅}. Let H = ⋃∞t=0Ht
denote the set of all personal histories. Further, the set of complete period t histories is given by Hˆt
and is defined so that each hˆ ∈ Hˆt contains all the information about everything that has happened
up to period t, namely, the t realized matchings and the chosen action profiles (an element of Aˆt).
Let Hˆ =
⋃∞
t=0 Hˆ
t denote the set of all complete histories. A (behavior) strategy for player i ∈ N
is defined as a mapping σi : H → ∆(Ai). The set of strategies of player i ∈ N is denoted by Σi. A
strategy profile σ is symmetric if, for each pair of players i and j such that ic = jc, we have σi = σj .
2.2 Payoffs
For each c ∈ C, uc : A → R denotes the stage-game payoffs of community c. We also use uc to
denote the natural extension to mixed actions. Given a player i ∈ N , ui = uic . Further, for each
i ∈ N , we also define his ex ante expected payoffs (across all possible matchings) as gi : AM → R.
Now, we define the expected payoffs in the repeated game. Given the matching technology, a
strategy profile σ induces a probability measure Pσ over the set of action profiles to be played. For
each i ∈ N , γTi denotes the (expected) undiscounted average utilities up to period T and γδi denotes
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the (expected) discounted average utilities. Formally,
γTi (σ) = EPσ
( 1
T
T∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
)
and γδi (σ) = EPσ
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1gi(at)
)
.
If a strategy profile is symmetric, then we can talk about the expected payoff of a community.
Given a player i ∈ N , γTic = γTi , γδic = γδi .
We extend the above expressions to define expected payoffs conditional on a given history.
For each period t¯ ≥ 0, each complete history hˆ ∈ Hˆ t¯, and each t > t¯, let Pσ(at | hˆ) denote
the probability of profile at being played in period t when hˆ has been realized and play thereafter
proceeds according to σ (well defined even if Pσ(hˆ) = 0). Then, for each i ∈ N we have
γTi (σ | hˆ) = EPσ(·|hˆ)
( 1
T
t¯+T∑
t=t¯+1
gi(a
t)
)
and γδi (σ | hˆ) = EPσ(·|hˆ)
(
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=t¯+1
δt−t¯−1gi(at)
)
.
2.3 Feasibility and individual rationality
Let F = co(u(A)) ⊂ RC be the feasible set of the stage game. We define now the different minmax
payoff notions we use, and the corresponding individually rational payoff sets.
Independent minmax. For each i ∈ N , vi = min
s−i∈
∏
j∈C\{ic}∆(Aj)
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, s−i).
The corresponding set of individually rational payoffs is IR = {x ∈ RC : x ≥ v}.
Correlated minmax. For each i ∈ N , wi = min
s−i∈∆(A−i)
max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
s−i(a−i)ui(ai, a−i).
Let IRC = {x ∈ RC : x ≥ w}.
Repeated game minmax.7 We say that player i ∈ N can be forced to utility xi ∈ R if, for each
ε > 0, there are σ−i ∈ Σ−i and T0 ∈ N such that,8 for each τi ∈ Σi and each T ≥ T0,
γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi + ε.
Now we are ready to define, for each player i ∈ N , i’s repeated game minmax payoff as
v∞i = inf{xi : i can be forced to xi}. Let IR∞ = {x ∈ RC : x ≥ v∞}.
Note that w is attained with correlated punishments and v with independent punishments. On
the other hand, v∞i lies somewhere in between since the punishing players can use past play to get
some degree of coordination. Thus, wi ≤ v∞i ≤ vi. Further, in the case of two communities,
wi = v
∞
i = vi and and IR = IRC = IR
∞.
7See Renault and Tomala (1998).
8We denote by N the set {1, 2, 3 . . .}.
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3 Strongly Uniform Equilibrium
In the anonymous random matching setting, equilibrium behavior is typically interpreted as a social
norm. In this context, the assumption that agents choose approximate best responses is reasonable,
and is consistent with evidence that people do not deviate from norms unless the implied gains are
high enough.9 This observation motivates the use of uniform equilibrium (UE), in which players’
strategies are (uniformly) approximate best responses to their rivals’ strategies.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ is a uniform equilibrium with payoff x ∈ RN if limT→∞γT (σ) =
x and, for each ε > 0, there is T0 such that, for each T ≥ T0, σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium in the
finitely repeated game with T periods, i.e., for each i ∈ N and each τi ∈ Σi,
γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ γTi (σ) + ε.
In this paper we go one step further and introduce a new equilibrium concept, strongly uni-
form equilibrium (SUE), which is a refinement of UE. In addition to the UE requirements, players’
strategies satisfy a strong version of sequential rationality after every history. This implies that equi-
librium behavior is not only (approximately) optimal ex ante, but indeed after any realized history
of play. An SUE also has the desirable feature of global stability: if we think of an equilibrium as a
positive description of behavior in large communities, we should require some stability, in the sense
that a small mistake by a single agent does not destroy the norm forever.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ is a strongly uniform equilibrium with payoff x ∈ RN if we
have that limT→∞γT (σ) = x and, for each t¯ ≥ 0, each hˆ ∈ Hˆ t¯, and each i ∈ N , the following
conditions hold:
1) limT→∞
1
T
t¯+T∑
t=t¯+1
gi(a
t) = xi Pσ(· | hˆ)-a.s.
2) For each τi ∈ Σi, lim sup
T→∞
1
T
t¯+T∑
t=t¯+1
gi(a
t) ≤ xi P(τi,σ−i)(· | hˆ)-a.s.
3) For each ε > 0, there is T0 ∈ N such that, for each T ≥ T0 and each τi ∈ Σi,
γTi (σ−i, τi | hˆ) ≤ γTi (σ | hˆ) + ε.
For most of the paper we work with symmetric strategy profiles, so we denote by E∗ ⊂ RC and
E ⊂ RC the sets of payoffs attainable in symmetric UE and SUE, respectively.
9See for instance Boyd and Richerson (2002).
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Clearly, an SUE is also a UE. Condition 1) implies that as T goes to infinity, x is not only
the expected payoff of σ, but also, almost surely, the realized payoff. Further, given any history,
if we look at the realized payoff from this history onwards, this payoff is almost surely x (as T
goes to infinity). This is a strong form of global stability (Kandori, 1992), which is usually stated
in expected terms. Condition 2) implies that, after every history, all deviations are almost surely
non-profitable (not only in expectation). Condition 3) implies that, for each history hˆ ∈ Hˆt, each
ε > 0, and each deviation after hˆ, if T is large enough, the expected profit will not be larger than ε.
This constitutes a strong form of approximate sequential rationality since, regardless of the beliefs
a player might have at an information set, no deviation would give him a profit larger than ε.10
For this last observation it is important that SUE is defined with respect to histories in Hˆ , not with
respect to personal histories. For instance, when looking at Condition 3), we have that a player
would not be able to make more than ε profit by deviating even if he could condition his deviation
on the complete history of past play, not only on what he has observed.11 Using histories in Hˆ leads
to a more demanding equilibrium concept and, thus, the obtained folk theorems are stronger results.
At this point, it may be worth relating SUE to the notion of uniform sequential equilibrium
introduced in Fudenberg and Levine (1991). Essentially, their equilibrium notion is captured by
Condition 3) above. Further, their definition is of the form “for each T0 there exists T ≥ T0 such
that”, i.e., under the equilibria they construct it may be that, for each T0 there is T ≥ T0 for which
the condition does not hold.12 They acknowledge this limitation, but say that they were not able to
strengthen the results in this direction. Fudenberg and Levine (1991) were also concerned with the
frequency of punishments on the equilibrium path, an issue for which Condition 2) in our definition
ensures that, in an SUE, punishments almost surely cease.
Below, we adapt the definition of SUE to the context of discounted payoffs and show that we
get an equilibrium concept weaker than SUE. Thus, our results are limited only by the fact that we
work with approximate equilibria, but not by the choice of undiscounted payoffs.13
Definition 3. A strategy profile σ is a discounted strongly uniform equilibrium (DSUE) with payoff
x ∈ Rn if limδ→1γδ(σ) = x and, for each t¯ ∈ N, each hˆ ∈ Hˆ t¯, and each i ∈ N the following
conditions hold:
1) limδ→1 (1− δ)
∞∑
t=t¯+1
δt−t¯−1gi(at) = xi Pσ(· | hˆ)-a.s.
10It is worth noting that condition 2) does not imply condition 3). This is because, in the latter, T0 is the same for all
τi ∈ Σi. This uniformity is not implied by the almost sure convergence in condition 2).
11In this sense, SUE has some flavor to belief-free equilibria (Ely and Va¨lima¨ki, 2002; Piccione, 2002; Ely et al., 2005).
12Mathematically, this is as working with the lim inf instead of the lim sup, which is significantly weaker. Because of
this, uniform sequential equilibrium does not imply uniform equilibrium.
13In Fudenberg and Levine (1991) the authors devote a whole section to make a similar point regarding the use of
discounted or undiscounted payoffs.
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2) For each τi ∈ Σi, lim sup
δ→1
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=t¯+1
δt−t¯−1gi(at) ≤ xi P(τi,σ−i)(· | hˆ)-a.s.
3) For each ε > 0, there is δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that, for each δ ∈ (δ0, 1) and each τi ∈ Σi,
γδi (σ−i, τi | hˆ) ≤ γδi (σ | hˆ) + ε.
Proposition 1. If a strategy profile σ is an SUE then it is a DSUE.
Proof. Given an arbitrary sequence of real numbers (xt)t∈N, let x¯T = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t and x¯δ = (1 −
δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1xt. Then, it is not hard to show that
lim sup
T→∞
x¯T ≥ lim sup
δ→1
x¯δ ≥ lim inf
δ→1
x¯δ ≥ lim inf
T→∞
x¯T ,
and so the convergence of x¯T implies the convergence of x¯δ to the same limit. The formal proof,
which can be seen in Renault and Tomala (2011, Lemma 2.15), relies on the fact that x¯δ =∑∞
T=1 T (1− δ)2δT−1x¯T .
Suppose that a strategy profile σ satisfies 1) in Definition 2. Then, 1T
∑t¯+T
t=t¯ gi(a
t) converges to
xi almost surely, which implies that the corresponding discounted average, (1− δ)
∑∞
t=t¯ δ
t−t¯gi(at),
also converges to xi almost surely, which establishes that 1) in Definition 2 implies 1) in Definition 3.
Since lim supT→∞ x¯T ≥ lim supδ→1 x¯δ, the argument for 2) is also straightforward. Concerning 3),
the proof follows from a straightforward adaptation of the second part of the proof of Lemma 2.15
in Renault and Tomala (2011).
It is not hard to construct counterexamples to show that the converse of Proposition 1 is not true.
3.1 General coincidence of UE and SUE payoff sets
While an SUE is a refinement of a UE in the sense that the strategies that constitute a UE do not
necessarily constitute an SUE, it turns out that the two solution concepts are equivalent in terms
of payoff sets. Formally, we prove that, if a particular individually rational and feasible payoff of
the stage game can be sustained in a UE, then there exists an SUE that achieves the same payoff.
In other words, when studying payoff sets, all the refinements contained in the definition of SUE
can be obtained at no cost. It is important to note that this equivalence result about payoff sets is
not specific to the random matching environment, and actually applies to any repeated game with
signals (private or public, deterministic or stochastic), with no other assumption than a finite set of
players N , finite sets of actions (in the stage game), and finite sets of signals for each player.
Theorem 1. For each infinitely repeated game with finite players, actions, and signals, the sets of
UE and SUE payoffs coincide.
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Because of its generality, this result is of independent interest, in order to facilitate the flow of
the paper, we relegate the proof to the Appendix. Crucially for this paper, the SUE constructed in
the proof has the following feature.
Corollary 1. In the anonymous random matching setting, if a symmetric strategy profile σ is a
uniform equilibrium, then there is a symmetric SUE that attains the same payoff.
3.2 A strategic Tchebychev inequality
Although we have relegate the proof of Theorem 1 to the Appendix, we present below a lemma
that is crucial for its proof (and other proofs in this paper). This result is a sort of generalization
of Tchebychev inequality that allows to show that the different punishments we will construct are
effective not only in expectation, but also almost surely.14 The result and its proof are slightly
adapted from Lemma 5.6 in Lehrer (1990). For the sake of completeness, we present below a short
proof that uses the standard Tchebychev inequality.15
Consider any finite two-player repeated game with a finite set of signals. Let A1 and A2 be
the sets of actions an g1 be player 1’s payoff function in the stage game. No further assumption is
made on the signals. Let s2 in ∆(A2) be a mixed action of player 2 in the stage game. Assume that
player 2 plays the strategy σ2 that consists of playing s2 at each period independently of everything
else. Let R be an upper bound on |g1|.
The idea underlying the lemma below is that, since player 2’s randomizations are independent
across time, regardless of the realized history, there is no way in which player 1 can strategically
use the information about past realizations of player 2’s actions to affect the distribution of his
current and future payoffs. Note that the result below does not depend on the quality of information
available to player 1 and, hence, it is independent of the signal structure.
Lemma 1 (A strategic Tchebychev inequality). Let σ2 be the strategy of player 2 that consists of
playing s2 ∈ ∆(A2) in every period. For each strategy σ1 of player 1, each length T ∈ N, and each
ε > 0,
P(σ1,σ2)
(∣∣∣ 1
T
T∑
t=1
g1(a
t
1, a
t
2)−
1
T
T∑
t=1
g1(a
t
1, s2)
∣∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ R2
ε2T
and, as a consequence,
P(σ1,σ2)
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
g1(a
t
1, a
t
2) ≥ max
a1∈A1
g1(a1, s2) + ε
)
≤ R
2
ε2T
.
14This result is needed to rule out, for instance, situations in which a player, using past information, can ensure that in
the repeated game punishment is effective with low probability (although very harsh when effective so that, in expectation,
he does not gain more than ε).
15The same arguments could be used with other types of inequalities, e.g., the Hoeffding inequality would give an
upper bound on exp(−εT ).
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Proof. Expectations and probabilities in this proof are with respect to P(σ1,σ2). For each t ∈
{1, . . . , T}, let Ft be the σ-field generated by history ht−1 = (at¯1, at¯2)t¯<t, and define the random
variable Zt = g1(at1, a
t
2) − g1(at1, s2). So defined, Zt is measurable with respect to Ft+1. Further,
since at2 is independent of h
t−1 we have that, for each t¯ ≤ t, E(Zt | Ft¯) = 0. Then, for each t¯ < t,
E(ZtZt¯) = E(E(ZtZt¯ | Ft¯+1)) = E(Zt¯E(Zt | Ft¯+1)) = 0.
Let Z =
∑T
t=1 Zt. Then, E(Z) = 0 and, since the Zt are uncorrelated, V (Z) =
∑T
t=1 V (Zt) ≤
TR2.16 By Tchebychev inequality,
P(|Z| ≥ Tε) ≤ V (Z)
ε2T 2
≤ R
2
ε2T
.
Therefore, P(| 1T
∑T
t=1 g1(a
t
1, a
t
2)− 1T
∑T
t=1 g1(a
t
1, s2)| ≥ ε) is, at most, R
2
ε2T
. The last observation
in the statement follows from the inequality 1T
∑T
t=1 g1(a
t
1, a
t
2) ≤ maxa1∈A1 g1(a1, s2).
It is important to note that Lemma 1 will be used several times in the following way: We consider
that a given player i is being minimaxed for T periods. Then, when invoking Lemma 1, this player i
will play the role of player 1 and all other players together will play the role of player 2.
3.3 Moral cost and sequential equilibrium
As discussed earlier, equilibria in the anonymous random matching setting are often viewed as social
norms. To see an alternative interpretation of strategies that constitute an SUE, consider a setting
with a discounted anonymous random matching game, in which agents suffer a (small) moral cost
each time they deviate from a prescribed social norm. It is easy to show that a strategy profile that
constitutes an SUE would constitute a standard (exact) sequential equilibrium in an environment
with (arbitrarily) small moral costs and discounting.
Formally, suppose there is λ > 0, no matter how small, such that each time a player deviates
from the prescribed social norm he faces a moral cost λ.
Lemma 2. If a strategy profile σ is an SUE then, for each λ > 0, there is δ0 such that, for each
δ ∈ (δ0, 1), σ is a sequential equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game with discount δ and moral
cost λ.
16To see that V (Zt) ≤ R2 just note the following. Let X = Zt. Then, V (X) = E(X2) and so
E(X2) =
∑
ai∈Ai
P(ati = ai)E(X2 | ati = ai) =
∑
ai∈Ai
P(ati = ai)V (g1(ai, atj)) ≤
∑
ai∈Ai
P(ati = ai)R2 = R2.
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4 Folk Theorems in the Anonymous Random Matching Setting
In this section, we present the three key results of this paper. First, we establish a folk theorem for
two communities by showing that E = F ∩ IR. We prove the result constructively, by describing
explicitly the equilibrium strategies and then showing that they constitute an SUE. A nice feature of
our construction is that the strategies are conceptually very simple. Similar to the seminal papers by
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), any target payoff is sustained in equilibrium using community
enforcement. In other words, if an agent observes a deviation, he responds by punishing his future
rivals, with the punishment action spreading the information that there has been a deviation.
Second, we show that the folk theorem extends to environments with more than two commu-
nities. The equilibrium strategies still retain the flavor of community enforcement. However, sus-
taining cooperation is more subtle with more than two communities, because in case of a deviation,
players now need to not only spread the information that there has been a deviation, but also need to
communicate the identity of the community from which a player deviated. We construct equilibrium
strategies that involve such credible punishments and communication.
Finally, we go back to the case of two communities, and consider an environment in which there
is imperfect monitoring. Even within a match, players do not perfectly observe the action of their
rival, but rather receive a noisy (possibly private) signal about their rival’s action. We present a weak
sufficient condition on the information structure under which the folk theorem obtains.
4.1 Folk theorem with two communities
Recall that Corollary 1 ensures that the sets of symmetric UE and SUE payoffs coincide. Thus, in
order to prove that E = F ∩ IR we can just prove the result for the set E∗ of uniform equilibrium
payoffs and then rely on Corollary 1 to get the result for SUE. Yet, in this section we have chosen
to construct the strongly uniform equilibrium profile explicitly, so that the reader can appreciate
that the equilibrium strategies are indeed quite natural. The idea of the strategy we construct is as
follows: The game is played in blocks of increasing length. In each block, on the equilibrium path,
players play the action profiles that achieve the target payoff. If a player observes a deviation, he
switches to the minmax action until the end of the current block. At the start of the new block,
players “restart” by again playing the action profiles that sustain the target equilibrium payoff.
Clearly, such a strategy profile achieves the target payoff. Further, since after a deviation the
game restarts from the next block, we have a strong form of global stability. Concerning the in-
centives, if a player plans to deviate early in a block, from some point on, with probability very
close to one, he will be minmaxed for a large number of periods. On the other hand, deviations
late in a block will not significantly affect the payoffs. The proof shows how to handle intermediate
deviations. Importantly, when a player is asked to revert to the minmax action, it is approximately
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optimal for him to spend the current block disciplining those who did not conform with the norm.
Theorem 2 (Folk Theorem for Two Communities). Suppose |C| = 2. Then, E = F ∩ IR.
Proof. Let x ∈ F ∩ IR. Let (a¯t)t be a sequence of pure action profiles whose average payoff
converges to x, i.e., limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 a¯
t = x.
Let 0 < α ≤ 1 be the maximum probability a pure action receives in either of the two minmax
mixed actions. We distinguish two cases in the definition of the strategy σ.
Case 1: α < 1. The strategy σ is played in consecutive blocks of increasing length, Bl , with
l ∈ N and starting with l = 3. For each l, block Bl consists of l4-periods. The strategy σ prescribes
playing grim trigger in each block. When a new block starts, regardless of the past, the players play
according to (a¯t)t (starting at t = 1) and, during this block, after every history in which a player has
observed at least one deviation, he minmaxes his opponent. Therefore, within each block, a player
can be either on the equilibrium path or in the punishment phase. For the sake of brevity, we refer
to these two states of a player as “uninfected” and “infected,” respectively.
Case 2: α = 1. The equilibrium strategy is the same one, except for the following modifica-
tion: each player of a community whose minmax action is a pure one, upon observing a deviation,
starts the punishment by randomizing uniformly over all his actions during l2 periods and then
switches to the minmax action.
We show that σ is an SUE. Clearly, limT→∞γT (σ) = x. Now, take t¯ ≥ 0, hˆ ∈ Hˆ t¯, and i ∈ N .
We divide each block Bl in three subblocks: Bl,1 and Bl,3 containing the first and last l3 periods,
respectively, and Bl,2 containing the l4 − 2l3 intermediate periods.
Condition 1) limT→∞ 1T
∑t¯+T
t=t¯+1 gi(a
t) = x1 Pσ(· | hˆ)-a.s. This follows from the fact that,
regardless of the history hˆ, the play is restarted at the end of each block, going back to (a¯t)t.
Condition 2) Suppose, without loss of generality, that a player i in community 1 deviates. We
want to show that, for each τi ∈ Σi, lim supT→∞ 1T
∑t¯+T
t=t¯+1 gi(a
t) ≤ x1 P(τi,σ−i)(· | hˆ)-a.s. All
probabilities and expectations in this proof are with respect to P(τi,σ−i). Since play is “restarted” at
the end of each block, it suffices to establish the above inequality with respect to the empty history,
i.e., t¯ = 0. First, note that, as soon as a player in community 2 observes a deviation, he gets infected
and starts punishing. Then, contagion starts and more people get infected and start punishing.
Case 1: α < 1. Given an infected player, unless all players in the other community are infected
as well, the probability that he infects a new player in the current period is, at least, 1−αM . To see
why, note that, regardless of what is supposed to be played on the equilibrium path, the infected
player will mismatch it with probability at least 1−α and 1M is a lower bound on the probability of
meeting an uninfected player. After the first deviation occurs, the deviating player infects his current
opponent. Then, the probability that one of the remaining 2M−2 players remains uninfected after l2
periods of contagion can be bounded above using a binomial distribution Bi(l2, 1−αM ). Let Yl denote
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the number of infected players after l2 periods and let p = 1−αM . Thus,
P (Yl < 2M − 2) ≤ P (Bi(l2, p) ≤ 2M)
large l
≤ P (|Bi(l2, p)− pl2|) ≥ l 85 ),
and, by Tchebychev inequality, P (|Bi(l2, p)− pl2| ≥ l 85 ) ≤ p(1− p)l
2
l
16
5
≤ 1
l
6
5
.
Case 2: α = 1. Suppose that the minmax action requires the players in at least one of the
communities to use a pure action and that (a¯t)t involves frequent use of it. In such a case, using
only the minmax action after getting infected might make the contagion spread very slowly. This
is the reason for the randomization during the first l2 stages after getting infected. Then, we can
parallel the above arguments with α = 1/2 (if the punishing player has at least two actions, the
probability of mismatching the equilibrium path one during these l2 periods is at least 12 ).
So far we have shown that, in both cases, the following property holds: if a player deviates in
period tˆ of a given block and period tˆ+ l2 still belongs to the same block, then the probability that
all players different from player i are in the punishment phase after period tˆ+l2 is, at least, 1−1/l 65 .
By definition of (a¯t)t, given ε ≥ 0 there is T0 such that, for each T ≥ T0, |
∑T
t=1
g(a¯t)
t −x| ≤ ε.
We now study the gains that the deviating player can make in each block. We distinguish several
cases, depending on the subblock at which the first deviation occurs. Let l ≥ T0ε ; in particular,
1
l ≤ ε. Let R = maxa∈A, j∈{1,2} |uj(a)|.
Late deviation. The first deviation occurs in subblock Bl,3. Then,
l4∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
l4
=
l4−l3∑
t=1
gi(a¯
t)
l4
+
l4∑
t=l4−l3+1
gi(a
t)
l4
≤ (l
4 − l3)(x1 + ε)
l4
+
l3R
l4
≤ x1 + ε+Rε.
Therefore, late deviations never lead to a gain higher than (R+ 1)ε.
Intermediate deviation. The first deviation occurs at period t˜, in subblock Bl,2. Then,
l4∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
l4
≤
t˜−1∑
t=1
gi(a¯
t)
l4
+
t˜+l2+1∑
t=t˜
R
l4
+
l4∑
t=t˜+l2+1
gi(a
t)
l4
≤ t˜(x1 + ε)
l4
+Rε+
l4∑
t=t˜+l2+1
gi(a
t)
l4
.
After period t˜ + l2 + 1 there have been already l2 periods of contagion so, with probability at
least 1 − 1/l 65 all the players have seen a deviation. For player 1 to make some gains after period
t˜+ l2 + 1 one of two things has to happen: either the contagion was not successful, which happens
with probability at most 1/l
6
5 or the contagion was successful but not the ensuing punishment. By
construction, from period t˜+ l2 + 1 on, there are at least l3 − l2 periods of punishment in Bl,3. Let
σˆ be any strategy profile where player 1 is being minmaxed. Then, using the strategic Tchebychev
inequality (Lemma 1), we have that the probability that player 1 makes a gain larger than ε while
This version: November 5, 2013
15
being punished during l3 − l2 periods is bounded by
Pσˆ(
l3−l2∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
l3 − l2 − v1 ≥ ε) ≤
R2
ε2(l3 − l2) .
Recall that, since x ∈ IR, x1 ≥ v1. Then, with probability at least (1 − 1l6/5 )(1 − R
2
ε2(l3−l2)), we
have
l4∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
l4
≤ t˜(x1 + ε)
l4
+Rε+
l4∑
t=t˜+l2+1
v1 + ε
l4
≤ (l
4 − l2)(x1 + ε)
l4
+Rε ≤ x1 + ε+Rε.
Therefore, the probability that player 1 gets more than (R+1)ε in block l is, at most, 1
l6/5
+ R
2
ε2(l3−l2) .
Early deviation. The first deviation occurs at period t˜, in subblock Bl,1. In this case we have
l2 periods of contagion followed by more than l3 periods of punishment and we can easily get that,
with probability at least (1− 1
l6/5
)(1− R2
ε2l3
),
l4∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
l4
≤ (t˜+ l
2 + 1)R
l4
+
(l4 − t˜− l2 − 1)(x1 + ε)
l4
≤ x1 + (R+ 1)ε.
Therefore, in all three cases, player 1 can make a gain larger than x1 + (R + 1)ε, with proba-
bility at most 1
l6/5
+ R
2
ε2(l3−l2) . Since
∑
l≥1(
1
l6/5
+ R
2
ε2(l3−l2)) < ∞, by Borel-Cantelli lemma, with
probability 1 there is l0 such that, for each l¯ ≥ l0, the payoff to player 1 in block l¯ is smaller than
x1 + (R+ 1)ε. Since this is true for every ε > 0, limT→∞
∑T
t=1
gi(a
t)
T ≤ x1 P(τi,σ−i)-a.s.
Condition 3) For each ε > 0, there is T0 ∈ N such that, for each T ≥ T0 and each τi ∈ Σi,
γTi (σ−i, τi | hˆ) ≤ γTi (σ | hˆ) + ε. This easily follows from the analysis above. For each block, in
case of a late deviation, the payoff is essentially given by the sequence (a¯t)t. The payoff in case of
an intermediate deviation is essentially given by (a¯t)t and the minmax phase. For an early deviation,
the payoff is essentially given by the minmax phase.
4.2 Folk theorem with more than two communities
The main complication when working with an arbitrary number of communities is that, in order to
make punishments as effective as possible, one needs to identify the community of a deviator. This
is a common problem in repeated games with imperfect monitoring which is deeply discussed, for
instance, in Gossner and Tomala (2009) where the authors present a simple three-player game in
which a payoff profile at which deviations are detectable cannot be sustained in equilibrium because
the deviator cannot be identified. Fudenberg and Levine (1991) abstract away from the identification
problem by restricting attention to the set of “mutually punishable payoffs”; each such payoff x has
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the property that there is some mixed action of the stage game that simultaneously forces all players
to a payoff below x. The main effort here is to show that, in our setting, deviators can be identified.
Since the explicit construction of an SUE is more involved than in the previous section, we
construct a the proof for UE payoffs and then rely on Corollary 1 to get the desired result. Given
any payoff in F ∩ IR∞, we construct a UE that achieves it. In addition to v∞i we define, for each
T ∈ N, vTi as the minmax payoff of player i in the T -period repeated game.
vTi = min
σ−i∈Σ−i
max
σi∈Σi
γTi (σi, σ−i).
The larger T is, the more coordination the punishing players can achieve. Indeed, vTi converges to
infT∈N vTi = v
∞
i .
Theorem 3. Suppose |C| ≥ 2. Then, E = F ∩ IR∞.
The case |C| = 2 corresponds with Theorem 2. Thus, we assume that |C| > 2. Similarly to
the case of two communities, we present strategies in which play proceeds in blocks. However, we
now introduce, between any two blocks of play, what we call communication blocks. During these
blocks, players use their actions to spread information about past play.In particular, the information
that a deviation has occurred and the identity of the community of the deviating player. Below we
describe the communication blocks and show that, if they are long enough, they enable detection of
deviations and identification of deviators.
Communication blocks. Assume that players are supposed to play a given sequence of pure
actions in some blockB. At the end ofB, we say that each player i ∈ N is in a state µ(i, c) ∈ {0, 1}
with community c in C, with the interpretation that µ(i, c) = 1 if and only if player i has seen a
deviation by someone of community c at some period in B. Fix two distinct actions ac and aˆc for
each community c. We define a communication block BL, to be played after block B, as follows.
BL has two consecutive subblocks BL,1 and BL,2, each subblock having L|C| periods.
The subblocks BL,1 and BL,2 are identical. Each comprises L consecutive periods targeting
community 1, followed by L consecutive periods targeting community 2, and so on. At each period
in which the target is community c ∈ C, each player i inN plays ai = aic if µ(i, c) = 0 and aˆi = aˆic
if µ(i, c) = 1. The interpretation of playing aˆi is that player i accuses someone from community c
of having deviated during blockB. At the end of the L periods targeting community c, each player i
updates his state as follows. If player i started block BL with µ(i, c) = 0 for all communities c,
and observed players of at least 2 different communities accusing community c (at the same or at
different periods), then player i sets µ(i, c) = 1; it is possible that µ(i, ic) = 1. Otherwise, player i’s
state does not change.
It is worthwhile to clarify why we need two subblocks in BL. Suppose that |C| = 3 and that
player i ∈ N has deviated in one period of block B. Now, if there is no other deviation in B or BL,
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only the players in ic can learn about player i’s deviation during BL,1. Then, in BL,2, since players
in ic will accuse their own community, all other communities will learn about the deviation as well.
Let σ be a strategy profile such that a given path of pure actions is to be played at some block
B, followed by a communication block BL. Deviations are temporarily ignored during block B.
Let Zi be the event: “player i has deviated from the path of pure actions in some period of B”. Let
Z¯ i be the complement of Zi. Let µL(i, c) be the final state of i regarding community c at the end of
BL.
Lemma 3 (Communication lemma). For each player i ∈ N and each strategy τi ∈ Σi, we have
1) “False accusations are ignored”.
P(τi,σ−i)(∀i′ 6= i,∀c 6= ic, µL(i′, c) = 0) = 1 and P(τi,σ−i)(∀i′ 6= i, µL(i′, ic) = 0 | Z¯ i) = 1.
2) “Deviations are detected”. There is f(L, |M |) such that limL→∞f(L, |M |) = 1 and
P(τi,σ−i)(∀i′ 6= i, µL(i′, ic) = 1 | Zi) ≥ f(L, |M |).
Proof of Lemma 3. Statement 1) is straightforward, since accusations by only one community are
unsuccessful. On the other hand, if a player i deviates in blockB, |C|−1 ≥ 2 players from different
communities observe this deviation and inform in block BL. Thus, given a community size |M |,
the probability of the states µL(i′, ic) = 1 goes to 1 as L goes to infinity.
In the proof of Theorem 3 we rely on the following well known characterization of uniform
equilibrium payoffs.17
Lemma 4. Let x ∈ RN . The following conditions are equivalent:
1) x is a uniform equilibrium payoff.
2) For each k ∈ N, there are σ ∈ Σ and T ∈ N such that, for each i ∈ N and each τi ∈ Σi,
γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi +
1
k
and γTi (σ) ≥ xi −
1
k
.
Proof of Theorem 3 (when |C| > 2). The inclusion E ⊂ F ∩ IR∞ is straightforward. We now
prove that F ∩ IR∞ ⊂ E. Let x in F ∩ IR∞ and let ε > 0. Our objective is to find T ∈ N and
a strategy profile σ of the T -period repeated game such that, for each i ∈ N and each τi ∈ Σi,
γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi + ε and γTi (σ) ≥ xi − ε. By Lemma 4, this will imply that x is a UE payoff and
then we can use Corollary 1 to get that x ∈ E.
17See Proposition 4.5 in Mertens et al. (1994, page 196) or Lemma 2.13 in Renault and Tomala (2011).
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Definition of σ. The strategy σ is played in L consecutive blocks, where L is a large number
to be fixed later. Each block l comprises a “payoff block” Bl of length L2 followed by a “commu-
nication block” Dl of length 2L|C|. The total number of periods is T = L(L2 + 2L|C|). For each
player i ∈ N , let σ¯i = σ¯ic denote a punishment strategy against player i in an L2-period game, i.e.,
for each τi ∈ Σi, γL2i (τi, σ¯i−i) ≤ vL
2
i .
18 At the start of the game, for each player i and community c,
the corresponding state is µ(i, c) = 0. This state will never be updated in payoff blocks.
During the first payoff block, B1, the players play a sequence (at)t of fixed pure actions
approximating the target payoff x. If L is large enough we can ensure that, for each i ∈ N ,
| 1L
∑
t∈B1 gi(a
t)− xi| ≤ ε.
During the first communication block, D1, the players communicate about what was played
in B1. During block D1, each player i, for each community c, updates his state variable µ(i, c) as
described before Lemma 3. This updating is such that µ(i, c) = 1 if and only if player i is convinced
that someone from community c has deviated from σ. We say that player i is “(as if) on the main
path” if µ(i, c) = 0 for each community c (including ic). We say that player i is in the “punishing
community c phase” if µ(i, c) = 1 and µ(i, c′) = 0 for c′ 6= c. Once a player is in a “punishing
community c phase” he no longer updates his states.
During each subsequent payoff block Bl, with l ≥ 2, play proceeds as follows. A player who
starts the block “on the main path” plays as in B1. A player i who starts the block in the “punishing
community c phase”, plays according to σ¯c (starting with the empty history at the beginning of the
block). During each subsequent communication block Dl, with l ≥ 2, a player i who starts Dl in a
“punishing community c phase” just communicates, without updating his states. A player who was
on the main path at the blockBl communicates and updates his states. In cases not described above,
prescribe play arbitrarily.
Now, let L be large enough so that the following conditions hold:
1) f(L, |M |) ≥ 1− ε, where f is the function whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 3.
2) For each player i, vL
2
i ≤ v∞i + ε (recall that limT→∞vTi = infT vTi = v∞i ).
3) The lengths of the communication blocks are negligible with respect to the lengths of the
payoff blocks, in the sense that 2L|C| ≤ εL2. This implies Lε ≥ 1, so that the length of any
block is large.
4) R ≤ εL, where R = maxa∈A, c∈C |uc(a)|.
Next, we examine the payoffs from playing σ and from deviating.
18Since everything is anonymous, punishing a player in a community is equivalent to punishing his community.
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Suppose that σ is played. Then all players always are “on the main path”. By the definition of
(at)t and using 3) above, we have
|γTi (σ)− xi| ≤
L(ε · L2 + 2R · 2L|C|)
L(L2 + 2L|C|) ≤
εL2 + 2RεL2
L2 + 2L|C| ≤
εL2(1 + 2R)
L2
= ε(1 + 2R).
Suppose that some player i ∈ N deviates to τi ∈ Σi. All probabilities and expectations here
are with respect to P(τi,σ−i). Denote byZ the event “player i always follows the path of pure actions
in payoff blocks” and by Z¯ the complementary event.
First, suppose thatZ holds. Then, all players except iwill always stay on the main path because,
by Lemma 3, a unilateral deviation by player i during a communication block cannot induce another
player to go off the main path. As a consequence, play in payoff blocks proceeds as if σ was being
played and we get
E(
1
T
T∑
t=1
(gi(a
t)) | Z) ≤ xi + ε(1 + 2R).
Next, assume that Z¯ holds. Let l¯ be the first block number in {1, . . . , L} such that all players
except i are on the main path at Bl and player i deviates at some period in Bl. With probability
at least (1 − ε), player i’s deviation is detected in block Dl¯ by all other players, so that his future
expected payoff is below v∞i + ε in each future payoff block. Since x ∈ IR∞, v∞i + ε ≤ xi + ε.
There are three situations in which player i may have high payoffs: (i) during the payoff block B l¯,
(ii) during communication blocks (proportion of periods at most ε), and (iii) if his deviation is not
detected (which occurs with probability at most ε). We thus have
E(
1
T
T∑
t=1
(gi(a
t)) | Z¯) ≤
iii)︷︸︸︷
εR +(1−ε)
( ii)︷︸︸︷
εR +(1−ε)(L− 1)(xi + ε) +
i)︷︸︸︷
R
L
)
≤ xi+2ε(1+R).
Thus, we have found a strategy profile σ and T = L(L2 + 2L|C|) so that, for each i ∈ N and each
τi ∈ Σi, γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi + ε(1 + 2R) and γTi (σ) ≥ xi − ε(1 + 2R). Therefore, by Lemma 4, x
can be sustained in a UE and, by Corollary 1, also in an SUE.
4.3 Folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring within a match
So far, we assumed that players perfectly observe the actions played in their own matches. An
important question is whether this result is robust to monitoring imperfections. In this section, we
go back to the two communities setting, but allow for imperfect monitoring within a match.
Recall that action sets are denoted by A1 for community 1 and A2 for community 2, and payoff
functions by u1 and u2. Now we add sets of signals Y1 and Y2 for communities 1 and 2, respectively,
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as well as a signaling function pi : A −→ ∆(Y ), where Y = Y1 × Y2. Within a match, if the player
from community 1 plays a1 in A1 and the player from community 2 plays a2 in A2, then a joint
signal (y1, y2) ∈ Y is drawn according to pi(a1, a2). The player from community 1 observes y1 and
the player from community 2 observes y2. As usual, we assume that each player remembers his
own actions. Signals may be stochastic and correlated across communities.
We want to characterize the subset E of R2 consisting of symmetric equilibrium payoffs of the
repeated game. Recall that, with 2 communities, all minmax payoff vectors coincide and IR =
IRC = IR∞. We provide a mild sufficient condition on the signal structure under which the folk
theorem obtains.19 We introduce the following observability condition.
Condition C: For each community c ∈ {1, 2}, each pure action ac ∈ Ac, and each mixed action
sc ∈ ∆(Ac), if ac and sc are different, then there is a pure action ac¯ of the other community such
that pi(ac, ac¯) and pi(sc, ac¯) have distinct marginals on the set of signals Yc¯ of community c¯.
This condition requires that, for each pure action ac ∈ Ac, the players in the other community
can manage to distinguish ac from any other (possibly mixed) action.20 It turns out that Condition C
above is sufficient to establish a folk theorem. Note that it does not imply that the players from a
given community can statistically distinguish any two mixed actions of the other community.21
In the context of standard repeated games, Kandori and Matsushima (1998) introduce a series of
similar conditions, also related to the possibility of statistically distinguish pairs of actions. Also
slightly related is the notion of “more informative actions” used, for instance, in Lehrer (1992c).
Theorem 4. Suppose that Condition C is satisfied. Then, for all utility functions and community
sizes, E = F ∩ IR.
Note that Theorem 2 is a particular case of this result. We present here the equilibrium construc-
tion and the intuition underlying the proof, which we develop formally in the Appendix. Recall that,
because of Corollary 1, it suffices to show that E∗ = F ∩ IR, i.e., it suffices to establish the result
for uniform equilibrium payoffs.
Equilibrium construction: For simplicity, we consider a pure action a¯ = (a¯1, a¯2) ∈ A such
19Note that some condition is needed to get a folk theorem. Think, for instance, of “trivial observation,” when players
observe nothing about their rivals’ actions. Formally, Y1 and Y2 are singletons. In such games, E is the convex hull of
the payoffs of the one-shot game. In order to sustain payoffs beyond the static Nash outcome, players need to observe
something about the behavior of other players.
20For a simple example in which this condition is violated, suppose thatA1 = {T,M,B}, and players in community 2
get two possible signals y and y′ and observe these independently of their own action. They observe y if a1 = M , y′ if
a1 = B and the stochastic signal 12y+
1
2
y′ if a1 = T . Here, a player in community 2 cannot determine whether a player
in community 1 is playing the pure action T or the mixed action 1
2
M + 1
2
B. The folk theorem may fail in this case.
21For instance, consider the following example. Suppose that A1 = {T,M1,M2, B}. Players from community 2
observe three possible signals y1, y2 and y3 (independently of their own action): they observe y1 if a1 = T , stochastic
signal 1
2
y1 +
1
2
y2 if a1 = M1, 12y1 +
1
2
y3 if a1 = M2, and 12y2 +
1
2
y3 if a1 = B. Here, Condition C is satisfied, and so
the folk theorem will hold. However, the mixed actions s1 = 12T +
1
2
B and s2 = 12M1 +
1
2
M2 both induce the signal
1
2
y1 +
1
4
y2 +
1
4
y3 and thus are statistically indistinguishable for the players in community 2.
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that u(a¯) ∈ IR and prove that u(a¯) ∈ E∗.22 The strategy σ is played in L′ consecutive blocks,
where all Bl blocks have the same length L. Thus, σ is defined in a repeated game with LL′
periods. We define a “main path” and a “punishment phase.” All players start on the main path. Let
R = maxa∈A, c∈C |uc(a)|.
Punishment phase. Once a player is in the punishment phase, he minmaxes his opponents at
every period independently of everything else, and never returns to the main path. Let sˆi ∈ ∆(Ai)
denote the action that minmaxes community j, with j 6= i.
Main path. We now consider a player i from community 1. The strategy of a player in com-
munity 2 is defined analogously.
s1 = (1− 1
K
) a¯1 +
1
K
U1,
where U1 is the uniform distribution over A1 and K is a constant to be fixed later. Let L′ = K,
L = K8, and η = 1
K2
. A player playing s1 first selects a¯1 or U1 with respective probabilities
(1− 1K ) and 1K , and in the latter case then selects an action according to the uniform law. Let 1ti be
the random variable that takes value one if player i has first selected U1 and value zero otherwise.
While on the main path, at the end of each block Bl, player i performs a statistical test to decide
whether to enter the punishment phase or not. The test is described as follows. Let pi1 and pi2
denote the respective marginals of pi over Y1 and Y2. Take a1 ∈ A1 and a signal y ∈ Y1. Player i
can compute the theoretical frequency of “playing a1 via U1 and observing y when the opponent is
playing s2” as
TH(a1, y) =
1
K|A1|pi1(y | a1, s2).
Player i can also compute the empirical frequency of “playing a1 via U1 and observing y”:
OBli(a1, y) =
1
L
|{t ∈ Bl, ati = a1,1ti = 1, yti = y}|.
Given this, player i uses the following simple test. If there are a1 ∈ A1 and y ∈ Y1 such that
|TH(a1, y)−OBli(a1, y)| ≥ η, then he enters the punishment phase. Otherwise, he remains on the
main path.
This concludes the definition of σ. We need to establish that it constitutes a UE. In the proof we
proceed in two steps. First, given that all players start out on the main path, we can use Tchebychev
inequality to find a lower bound for the probability with which all players will remain on the main
path and play according to s1 or s2 for all L′ blocks. Indeed, we can show that, for K large enough,
with high probability all players will remain on the main path and play according to s1 or s2 for all
L′ blocks, and therefore, the average expected payoff is approximately the target payoff. Second,
22In Footnote 28 in the Appendix we comment on the case in which the target payoff is not achievable in pure actions.
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we show that no player can do much better by deviating. The idea here is that a deviating player
cannot make a significant gain without being detected. For this part it is crucial that this player
cannot condition on past history to influence the probabilities with which he is detected while still
making some profit. The reason for this is that, within a block, regardless of what he plays, the
behavior he faces is coming from the composition of i.i.d. draws.
It is worthwhile to highlight that Theorem 4 only provides a sufficient condition for the folk
theorem. Finding a necessary and sufficient condition on the signal structure for the folk theorem to
hold for any payoff function is a difficult problem. Indeed, the question is unanswered even in the
case of 2 players (in our setting, 2 communities with a single player each), although Condition C is
known not to be necessary (see the notion of more informative actions in Lehrer (1992a,b,c)).
5 Discussion
In this section, we present some interesting, qualitative observations based on our study of the set
of SUE payoffs in the anonymous random matching setting.
5.1 Sustaining asymmetric payoffs
So far, we restricted attention to symmetric strategy profiles, which deliver the same expected payoff
to all players within a community. Here we explore whether there is room for equilibria or social
norms that sustain a certain number of free riders in a society. In such equilibria, social surplus may
not be maximized, but this may still be better than full break down of cooperation. We study this
possibility by considering the prisoner’s dilemma, and show that it is possible to sustain equilibria
in which a fixed group of people in the community are allowed to defect while the others cooperate.
Formally, this means that while the average payoffs sustainable in symmetric SUE lie in F ∩ IR, it
is possible to get non-symmetric equilibria in which some players to get payoffs outside the set of
feasible and individually rational payoffs of the stage game.23
C2 D2
C1
D1
(
(1, 1) (−1, 2)
(2,−1) (0, 0)
)
In the Appendix we prove the following result for the above version of the prisoner’s dilemma.
23A similar observation was made by Dal Bo´ (2007), who obtains a folk theorem with respect to the 2M -dimensional
feasible set of “society payoffs”. Dal Bo´ (2007) assumes either perfect information or local information transmission
(Kandori, 1992; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995), whereas we consider a setting in which a player gets no infor-
mation about matches not involving him.
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Theorem 5. Let M ∈ N be the community size and let K ∈ N, K ≤ M2 . There is a non-symmetric
SUE in which each player in community 1 gets payoff 1 − 2K/M , K players in community 2 get
payoff 2 and the remaining players in community 2 get payoff 1.
It is worthwhile to point out that, though the result above establishes that some asymmetry in
payoffs can be supported in equilibrium, we believe that it is unlikely that a full folk theorem can
be achieved. The main difficulty in sustaining asymmetric payoffs is preventing the players who are
supposed to get low payoffs from “impersonating” those players in the same community who get
higher payoffs. In our setting, this entails two challenges: to identify that a deviation has occurred,
and to punish appropriately. Since punishments occur even on the equilibrium path, we also have to
ensure that players do not have strong incentives to defect.
To prove the result, for each K ≤ M2 , we construct an equilibrium in which K players in one
community are allowed to defect while the rest of society cooperates. Review blocks are needed to
prevent (or control) deviations (impersonations). Notice that the higher K is, the greater is the loss
in “social surplus”. The aggregate payoffs go down from 2M if everybody cooperates, to 2M −K
when K players in one of the two communities defect.
5.2 Use of correlated punishments
In Theorem 3 we established that the set of SUE payoffs is F ∩ IR∞. Yet, we offer no explicit
characterization of v∞, which defines the relevant feasible and individually rational set. In general
repeated games, computing this value is a hard problem, and is much beyond the scope of this
paper.24 Interestingly, we can show how in our setting of repeated anonymous random matching
games it may happen that v∞ < v and, therefore, F ∩ IR is a strict subset of F ∩ IR∞. Put
differently, there is room for some correlation in punishments. Knowing how close we can get to
perfectly correlated punishments is an open question.
We present below two examples to illustrate that v∞ < v. In particular, we show that we can
force a player i ∈ N to a payoff xi strictly below vi (see Section 2.3). More precisely, there is
xi < vi such that, for each ε > 0, there are σ−i ∈ Σ−i and T0 ∈ N such that, for each τi ∈ Σi and
each T ≥ T0, γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi + ε.
Example 1. Suppose that there is perfect monitoring within a match and take the three player game
24It has been studied for special cases in Gossner and Tomala (2007); see also Gossner and Ho¨rner (2010).
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whose payoff function is given by the following matrices:
E2 W2
E1
W1
(
(0, 0,−1) (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
)
E3
E2 W2(
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0) (0, 0,−1)
)
W3
Clearly, in this game the correlated minmax is w = (0, 0,−1/2) and the independent minmax
is v = (0, 0,−1/4), with v3 achieved when players 1 and 2 randomize uniformly between their
two actions. Since w3 < v3, it may be possible to bring players in community 3 below payoff
v3 if players in communities 1 and 2 manage to use correlated punishments. In order to force a
player i in community 3 to a payoff below v3, the other players in his community will help players
in communities 1 and 2 to correlate. Suppose thatM = 5. Consider the following strategy profile σ,
played in blocks of size l + 1, where l is to be determined.
• Each player in community 3 other than player i plays W3, . . . ,W3 or E3, . . . , E3 with equal
probabilities, in periods 1, . . . , l. This is unobservable to player i. Their choice for period l+1
is irrelevant.
• In the first l periods of each block, players in communities 1 and 2 minmax community 3, i.e.,
they randomize uniformly between their two actions. In period l+1 a player in community c ∈
{1, 2} plays Wc if he has seen W3 more often than E3 and, otherwise, plays Ec.
It is easy to check that, during each of the first l periods in each block, setting aside player i, with
probability 5/16, three or four players in community 3 will be playingE3; with the same probability
three or four players will be playing W3; and, with probability 6/16, two players will play E3 and
two players will play W3. Unless we are in the latter case, as l becomes large, the players in
communities 1 and 2 will successfully correlate to punish player i in period l+ 1 (using the actions
of players in community 3 to coordinate); regardless of what player i does. However, there is a
trade-off. A larger l improves correlation, but increases the number of periods in which player i is
“only” punished to his minmax level vi. Clearly, the best reply of player i is to stick to one action,
say W3, during the first l periods (this increases the likelihood of communities 1 and 2 correlating
on (W1,W2)) and then switch to the opposite action, E3, in period l + 1. Yet, player i can only
influence the choices in period l+ 1 if the players in his own community were equally split between
W3 and E3. Hence, as l increases, the probability of successful correlation goes to 10/16, in which
case player i would expect a payoff of −1/2 in period l + 1. Therefore, the expected payoff of
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player i in each block is bounded above by
r(l) =
l · −14 + 1 · −12 1016f(l)
l + 1
, where liml→∞f(l) = 1.
Hence, there is l0 such that, for each l > l0, r(l) < −14 = v3. In particular, one of the best choices
of l in this example would be 81, leading to a utility for player i of at most − 5012000 < −14 . 3
Example 2. The stage game in this example is a kind of generalization of the one above, again
assuming that there is perfect monitoring within a match. In the stage game there are three players
and each player i has 5 actions a1i , . . . , a
5
i . Payoffs to all players are (0, 0, 0), except when all
players chose the action with the same number, leading to a payoff of (0, 0,−1). It is not hard to
see that w = (0, 0,−1/5) and v = (0, 0,−1/25), so w3 < v3. Let M = 2.
We want to punish a player i in community 3. The strategy profile is played in blocks of only
two periods. In the first period, players in communities 1 and 2 completely randomize and, in the
second period, players in community 1 repeat the same action and players in community 2 copy
the action observed in period 1. According to these strategies, in period 1, player i is minmaxed,
and his expected payoff is −1/25. In period 2, with probability 1/4 player i is matched with the
two players that did not play against him on period 1. In this case, these two players will perfectly
correlate and player i has no information about this correlation. Therefore, no matter what player i
does, his expected payoff is bounded by v3+
1
4
w3
2 = − 9200 < − 125 = v3. 3
References
Boyd, R., P. J. Richerson. 2001. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, chap. Norms and
Bounded Rationality, 281–296. MIT Press, Cambridge.
———. 2002. Group Beneficial Norms can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 215 287–296.
Dal Bo´, P. 2007. Social norms, cooperation and inequality. Economic Theory 30 89–105.
Deb, J. 2012. Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Random Matching
Games with Names. Mimeo.
Deb, J., J. Gonza´lez-Dı´az. 2013. Community Enforcement Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Mimeo.
Ellison, G. 1994. Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching.
Review of Economic Studies 61 567–88.
This version: November 5, 2013
26
Ely, J. C., J. Ho¨rner, W. Olszewski. 2005. Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games. Econometrica
73 377–415.
Ely, J. C., J. Va¨lima¨ki. 2002. A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of
Economic Theory 102 84–105.
Forges, F., J. F. Mertens, A. Neyman. 1986. A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting.
Economics Letters 20 7.
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine. 1991. An approximate Folk theorem with imperfect private information.
Journal of Economic Theory 54 26–47.
Gossner, O., J. Ho¨rner. 2010. When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to
the minmax payoff? Journal of Economic Theory 145 63–84.
Gossner, O., T. Tomala. 2007. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.
Mathematics of Operations Research 32 413–424.
———. 2009. Repeated Games with Complete Information. In R. Meyers, ed., Encyclopedia of
Complexity and Systems Science. Springer.
Hasker, K. 2007. Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games.
International Journal of Game Theory 36 137–146.
Kandori, M. 1992. Social Norms and Community Enforcement. Review of Economic Studies 59
63–80.
Kandori, M., H. Matsushima. 1998. Private Observation, Communication and Collusion. Econo-
metrica 66 627–652.
Lehrer, E. 1990. Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-Standard Information.
International Journal of Game Theory 19 191–207.
———. 1992a. Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions.
Mathematics of Operations Research 17 175–199.
———. 1992b. On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect
Monitoring. International Journal of Game Theory 20 211–226.
———. 1992c. Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs.
Mathematics of Operations Research 17 200–224.
This version: November 5, 2013
27
Mailath, G. J., L. Samuelson. 2006. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships.
Oxford University Press.
Mertens, J. F., S. Sorin, S. Zamir. 1994. Repeated Games. CORE discussion paper 9420. Lovain-
la-Neuve.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., A. Postlewaite. 1995. Social Norms and Random Matching Games. Games
and Economic Behavior 9 79–109.
Piccione, M. 2002. The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring. Journal
of Economic Theory 102 70–83.
Radner, R. 1980. Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with
Long but Finite Lives. Journal of Economic Theory 22 136–154.
———. 1981. Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship.
Econometrica 49 1127–1148.
Renault, J., T. Tomala. 1998. Repeated proximity games. International Journal of Game Theory 27
539–559.
———. 2011. General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. Dynamic Games and Applications 1
319–350.
Sorin, S. 1986. On repeated games with complete information. Mathematics of Operations Research
11 147–160.
Takahashi, S. 2010. Community enforcement when players observe partners’ past play. Journal of
Economic Theory 145 42–62.
Tomala, T. 1999. Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors. Games and
Economic Behavior 28 310324.
A Appendix
A.1 Coincidence of UE and SUE payoff sets
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1, which states that, for every infinitely repeated
game with finite actions and signals, the sets of UE and SUE payoffs coincide.
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Proof of Theorem 1. It is sufficient to prove that every UE payoff is an SUE payoff. Fix a uniform
equilibrium payoff x ∈ RN and define, for each length T and strategy profile σ,
εT (σ) = max
i∈N
{|γTi (σ)− xi| , max
τi∈Σi
{γTi (τi, σ−i)− xi}
} ≥ 0.
The condition εT (σ) ≤ ε implies that σ is a 2ε-Nash equilibrium of the T -period game with payoff ε
close to x. Let εT = minσ∈Σ εT (σ).25 In a (T+T ′)-repeated game it is possible to follow a strategy
σ for T periods and then, independently, a strategy σ′ for T ′ periods, and by this concatenation
principle we have that (T + T ′)εT+T ′ ≤ TεT + T ′εT ′ . The sequence (εT )T∈N being bounded,
this implies its convergence to infT≥1εT . Further, since x is a uniform equilibrium payoff, we have
infT≥1εT = 0. For each L ∈ N, let σL be a profile achieving the minimum in the definition of εL.
The payoff to player i if σL is played for L periods is γLi (σ
L) ∈ [xi − εL, xi + εL].
We now construct σ, an SUE with payoff x. Play proceeds in consecutive blocks of increasing
length, BL. Each block BL is itself divided into L2 consecutive subblocks BL,1, BL,2, . . . , BL,L
2
.
Each of these subblocks has length L, so that the length of the block BL is L3. At each subblock
BL,l, σL is played, independently of what has happened before.
We now prove that σ is an SUE. Let R = maxa∈A, c∈C |uc(a)|. Fix a player i in N and define,
for each subblock BL,l, its average payoff by
XL,l =
1
L
∑
t∈BL,l
gi(a
t) and, similarly, let XL =
1
L2
L2∑
l=1
XL,l.
Both XL,l and XL are bounded random variables defined in [−R,R]. Now we prove the three
conditions in Definition 2.26
Condition 1) Assume that σ is played by all players. At a given block BL, the strategy σL is
repeated L2 times, so that (XL,l)l∈{1,...,L} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with expectation
γLi (σ
L) ∈ [xi − εL, xi + εL]. By Tchebychev inequality, we obtain, for each ε > 0,
Pσ(|XL − γLi (σL)| ≥ ε) ≤
R2
ε2L2
and, thus, Pσ(|XL − xi| ≥ ε+ εL) ≤ R
2
ε2L2
.
Since εL goes to 0 and
∑
L≥1
R2
ε2L2
< ∞, by Borel-Cantelli lemma, with probability 1 there is L0
such that, for each L ≥ L0, |XL − xi| ≤ 2ε. As a consequence, limL→∞XL = xi Pσ-a.s. Now, it
easily follows that limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 gi(a
t) = xi Pσ-a.s. Further, since the payoffs are bounded, we
can apply Lebesgue’s convergence theorem to get limT→∞γTi (σ) = xi.
25The strategy sets are compact (endowed with the product topology) and the payoff functions are continuous.
26Note that Condition 1) already implies limT→∞γT (σ) = x; it suffices to take the empty history in 1) and then, since
the random variables are bounded, almost sure convergence to xi implies convergence on average.
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Condition 2) Assume now that player i deviates to τi, whereas the other players follow σ. In
what follows, all expectations or probabilities are computed with respect to the probability P(τi,σ−i).
Let GL denote the L-period repeated game with average payoffs. GL is nothing but a finite
game with payoffs in [−R,R], and the block BL may be viewed as the repetition of the game
GL during L2 “stages” (each stage now corresponding to a subblock of BL, hence to L original
periods). At each “stage” in which game GL is played, the players different from player i play i.i.d.
a mixed action profile corresponding to the first L periods of the strategy σL−i. By definition of σ
L,
this mixed action forces the expected payoff of player i to be at most xi + εL at each stage of BL.
As a consequence, by the strategic Tchebychev inequality (Lemma 1) we have that, for each ε > 0,
P(τi,σ−i)(XL ≥ xi + εL + ε) ≤
R2
ε2L2
.
Again by Borel-Cantelli lemma, with probability 1 there is L0 such that, for each L ≥ L0, XL ≤
xi + 2ε and, thus, lim supT→∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 gi(a
t) ≤ xi P(τi,σ−i)-a.s.
Condition 3) We establish this property of σ for the initial history; because of the structure of
σ, the proof after any other history is analogous. For each L we have, by definition of σL, that
E(XL) ≤ xi + εL. Fix ε > 0 and let L0 be such that, for each L¯ ≥ L0, εL¯ ≤ ε. Now, let L1 be
such that, for Lˆ ≥ L1,27
L0−1∑
L=1
L3 ≤ ε
Lˆ−1∑
L=L0
L3 and Lˆ3 ≤ ε
Lˆ−1∑
L=L0
L3.
Let T be large enough so that period T belongs to a block BLˆ with Lˆ ≥ L1. Then,
TγTi (τi, σ−i) ≤
L0−1∑
L=1
L3R+
Lˆ−1∑
L=L0
L3(xi+ε)+RLˆ
3 and, hence, γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi+ε(1+2R).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Given a pure action profile a¯ = (a¯1, a¯2) ∈ A such that u(a¯) ∈ IR, in Section 4.3 we
defined a strategy profile σ. We now rely on Lemma 4 to show that σ is a UE with payoff u(a¯). Let
R = maxa∈A, c∈C |uc(a)|.28 Recall that the number of blocks is L′ = K, the length of each block
is L = K8, and η = 1
K2
, where K is a large integer to be determined.
Payoff from playing σ. Suppose that σ is played, and consider a block Bl in which all players
27To see that such an Lˆ exists, just recall that
∑Lˆ
L=1 L
3 =
( Lˆ(Lˆ+1)
2
)2.
28 In case the target payoff in F ∩ IR is not achievable in a pure action profile, one can approximate it by a cycle of
pure actions, and then the proof will essentially go through, doing statistical tests independently for each element of the
cycle, and minmaxing at every single period while in the punishment phase.
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are on the main path. For each player i in community 1, each action a1 ∈ A1, and each signal
y we have, by Tchebychev inequality, that Pσ(|TH(a1, y) − OBli(a1, y)| ≥ η) ≤ 1η2L . We can
obtain an analogous inequality for players in community 2. Then, we have that, with probability
at least 1 − M(|A1||Y1|+|A2||Y2|)
η2L
, all players start block Bl+1 on the main path. Thus, when playing
according to σ, all players remain on path throughout the game with probability at least 1−α, where
α = (L
′−1)M(|A1||Y1|+|A2||Y2|)
η2L
. Take a player i in community c. Then, for each block l,
∣∣∣EPσ( 1L ∑
t∈Bl
gi(a
t))−ui(s1, s2)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2αR, so ∣∣∣EPσ( 1LL′
LL′∑
t=1
gi(a
t))−ui(a¯1, a¯2)
∣∣∣ ≤ (2α+ 4
K
)R.
Thus, for K large enough, we have
∣∣EPσ( 1LL′ ∑LL′t=1 gi(at))− ui(a¯1, a¯2)∣∣ ≤ 5RK .
Payoff from deviating from σ. Suppose that a player i in community 1 deviates to some
strategy τi (the argument for community 2 is analogous). All probabilities and expectations here are
with respect to P = P(τi,σ−i). We now define a couple of random variables. Letm(t) ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
denote the identity of the player in community 2 facing player i in period t. Let βl denote the number
of players from community 2 in the punishment phase when blockBl starts. Clearly, βl takes values
in {0, . . . ,M} and β1 = 0. We denote by s¯li the empirical frequency played by player i in block
Bl, that is, s¯li =
1
L
∑
t∈Bl a
t
i ∈ ∆(A1). Let Xl = 1L
∑
t∈Bl gi(a
t) − ui(a¯). The main goal in the
rest of the proof is to control Xl. Given ε > 0, by the strategic Tchebychev inequality (Lemma 1)
we have that, with probability at least 1− R2
ε2L
,
∣∣∣ 1
L
∑
t∈Bl
gi(a
t)− ui(s¯li, sl2)
∣∣∣ ≤ ε, where sl2 = (M − βl)s2 + βlsˆ2M . (1)
The above inequality means that player i’s payoff in block Bl can be approximately computed as if
he was playing the mixed action s¯li i.i.d. during the block.
We now apply Lemma 1 again in a more sophisticated way. We want to show that, no matter
how player i is supposed to play (according to τi), he cannot do much better than what he would
by playing according to s¯li i.i.d. during the block; non only in terms of payoffs on this block, but
also regarding future payoffs, i.e., regarding the number of players in the other community who will
enter the punishment phase. Thus, to some extent, all player i can choose is the empirical frequency
s¯li: there is no significant gain to be made by using the history of play. The reason for this is that the
behavior he faces is coming from the composition of i.i.d. draws.
To see this, fix a player m¯ in community 2 who is on the main path at block Bl, an action a2
in A2, and a signal y2 in Y2. Consider a (non-strategic) fictitious “superplayer” 2 who just carries
out all the randomizations that may be needed at each period of the block. He selects the identity
m(t) of the player from community 2 meeting player i at period t, the action in A2 he plays as σ2
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would, and also a realization of pi2 given the chosen actions; randomizations across periods are i.i.d.
Consider a new two-player game in which player i acts as player 1 and the fictitious superplayer
acts as player 2. The payoff function for player i is an indicator function that takes on value 1 if
“the superplayer selectsm(t) = m¯, a2 via the uniform law, and y2,” and takes on value 0 otherwise.
Applying Lemma 1 to these strategies and payoff function, we get29
P
(∣∣ 1
L
∑
t∈Bl
1m(t)=m¯,1tm¯=1,atm¯=a2,ytm¯=y2 −
1
MK|A2|pi2(y2 | s¯
l
i, a2)
∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ 1
ε2L
. (2)
The above inequality means that the law of the number of stages in Bl where: “player i meets
player m¯, player m¯ selects the uniform distribution U2, plays a2, and observes signal y2” can also
be approximately computed as if player i was playing s¯li i.i.d. during the block.
Let αl denote the number of players in community 1, different from i, who are in the punishment
phase at block Bl. This random variable takes values in {0, . . . ,M − 1} and, whenever player m¯
does not meet the deviating player i, he faces M − 1 − αl players playing s1 and αl players using
sˆ1. As a consequence, if we let Q = αlpi2(y2 | sˆ1, a2) + (M − 1− αl)pi2(y2 | s1, a2), we have, by
Tchebychev inequality,
P
(∣∣ 1
L
∑
t∈Bl
1m(t) 6=m¯,1tm¯=1,atm¯=a2,ytm¯=y2 −
Q
MK|A2|
∣∣ ≥ ε ∣∣∣ αl) ≤ 1
ε2L
. (3)
Summing up equations (2) and (3) we have that, with probability at least 1− 2|Y2||A2|
ε2L
, given αl
∀a2, ∀y2,
∣∣∣∣OBlm¯(a2, y2)− 1K|A2|pi2
(
y2
∣∣∣ αl
M
sˆ1 +
(M − 1− αl)
M
s1 +
1
M
s¯li, a2
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε. (4)
For each α ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, let εˆα be the function defined, for each r ≥ 0, by
εˆα(r) = max
{
ui(s1, s2)− ui(a¯1, s2), s2 ∈ ∆(A2), s1 ∈ ∆(A1) s.t. ∀y2 ∈ Y2,∀a2 ∈ A2,∣∣∣∣pi2(y2 | a¯1, a2)− pi2(y2 ∣∣∣ αsˆ1 + (M − 1− α)a¯1 + s1M ,a2)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ r}.
Notice that εˆα does not depend on the parameters K, L, L′, η. The function εˆα is non-decreasing,
and because Condition C holds and a¯1 is a pure action, we have limr→0 εˆα(r) = 0. Assume now
player m¯ does not enter punishment phase after block Bl. Then, for all a2 and y2, |TH(a2, y2) −
29Recall that 1tm¯ denotes the random variable that takes value one if player m¯ has first selected U2 and value zero
otherwise.
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OBlm¯(a2, y2)| ≤ η and by Inequality (4) and the definition of TH(a2, y2) we have
1
K|A2|
∣∣∣∣pi2(y2 | s1, a2)− pi2(y2 ∣∣∣ αlsˆ1 + (M − 1− αl)s1 + s¯liM ,a2)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η + ε.
We now use the definition of s1 to get∣∣∣∣pi2(y2 | a¯1, a2)− pi2(y2 ∣∣∣ αlsˆ1 + (M − 1− αl)a¯1 + s¯liM ,a2)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ K|A2|(η + ε) + 2/K.
This implies, by definition of εˆα, that, for each s2 ∈ ∆(A2),
ui(s¯
l
i, s2)− ui(a¯1, s2) ≤ εˆαl(K|A2|(η + ε) + 2/K).
We use s2 = sl2 =
(M−βl)s2+βlsˆ2
M and get from Equation (1) that, with probability at least 1− R
2
ε2L
,
1
L
∑
t∈Bl
gi(a
t) ≤ ε+ ui(s¯li, sl2) ≤ ui(a¯1, sl2) + ε+ εˆαl(K|A2|(η + ε) + 2/K)
≤ ui(a¯1, a¯2) + 2R/K + ε+ supαεˆα(K|A2|(η + ε) + 2/K)
where the last inequality uses the facts that sˆ2 minmaxes community 1 and a¯ is IR.
Summing up, we have proved that for each block number l and each ε > 0,
P
(
βl+1 = βl, Xl > 2R/K + ε+ supαεˆα(K|A2|(η + ε) + 2/K)
) ≤ R2 + 2|Y2||A2|
ε2L
(5)
We now fix ε = η and use η = ε = 1
K2
, L = K8, K = L′. Then, given an error ε′ > 0, one can
find K0 such that for each value of K ≥ K0, Equation (5) implies that, for each block l,
P(βl+1 = βl, Xl > ε′) ≤ ε′. (6)
Now consider K large enough so that K ≥ K0 and 5RK ≤ ε′ (recall the no deviation case). Then,
for each block l,
E(Xl1βl+1=βl) = P(Xl > ε′, βl+1 = βl)E(Xl | Xl ≥ ε′, βl+1 = βl)
+ P(Xl ≤ ε′, βl+1 = βl)E(Xl | Xl < ε′, βl+1 = βl) ≤ (2R+ 1)ε′.
Notice now that the size of a community is fixed, so that
∑L′
l=1 1βl+1>βl ≤M .
E(
1
L′
L′∑
l=1
Xl) = E(
1
L′
L′∑
l=1
Xl1βl+1=βl +
1
L′
L′∑
l=1
Xl1βl+1>βl) ≤ (2R+ 1)ε′ +
RM
K
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If RMK ≤ ε′, the strategy profile σ is a symmetric 2(R+1)ε′-Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated
game with LL′ periods, with payoff ε′-close to u(a¯). By Lemma 4, u(a¯) is a UE payoff.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. By Lemma 4, in order to establish that a payoff x is a UE payoff, it suffices to find, for each
ε > 0, T ∈ N and a strategy profile σ of the T -period repeated game such that, for each i ∈ N and
each τi ∈ Σi, γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ xi + ε and γTi (σ) ≥ xi − ε. Then, Theorem 1 ensures that x is also an
SUE payoff.
Denote by NC,1 the set of players in community 1, by ND,2 a fixed set of K players in com-
munity 2 and by NC,2 the set of remaining players in community 2. Let L be a large number.
We construct a strategy profile σ to be played in consecutive blocks, alternating Bl and Dl blocks,
l ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Each block Bl lasts L5 periods, while each block Dl lasts L periods. Thus, the
total length of the game is T = L(L5 + L).
Each player i ∈ N is in state µi ∈ {0, 1}. The interpretation of µi = 0 is that player i is “on
the main path”, i.e., he thinks that no one has deviated yet, and µi = 1 means that player i is “in
the punishment phase”, i.e., he thinks that it is likely that a deviation has occurred. All players start
with µi = 0. A player in the punishment phase never returns to the main path.
TheBl blocks are used for payoffs. In such a block, while on the main path, all players cooperate
except for those in ND,2, who defect in every period. In the punishment phase, every player defects
at every period of Bl. The Dl blocks are used for communication. At each period of such a block,
players on the main path cooperate and players in the punishment phase defect.
It remains to describe how players update their states. A player i in community 2 switches to
µi = 1 if and only if he faces a defection. A player i in community 1 switches to µi = 1 in two
cases. First, he switches to µi = 1 if he faces a defection during a communication block. Second, at
the end of a payoff block Bl, he computes the frequency of observed defections at Bl and switches
to µi = 1 if this frequency is higher than K/M + 1/L. Note that, if no player deviates, this
frequency should to be close to K/M .
We show that, given ε > 0, for large enough L, σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium of the T -period
repeated game. We impose the following two conditions on L:
1) Suppose that at most one player i deviates from σ and some player j 6= i starts a communica-
tion blockDl in the punishment phase, i.e., µj = 1. Then, L is large enough so that at the end
of block Dl, with probability at least 1− ε, every player m ∈ N\{i} satisfies that µm = 1.
2) Length L is such that M/L ≤ ε. In particular, this implies that L/L5 = 1/L4 ≤ ε, i.e., the
length of the communication blocks is small with respect to the total number of periods. It
also implies a low probability of ever reaching a punishment phase if σ is played.
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Payoff from playing σ. Consider a block Bl in which all players are on the main path and fix
a player i ∈ NC,1. Let Xti be the random variable given by Xti = 1 if player i faced a defection at
period t and Xti = 0 otherwise. The sequence (X
t
i )t∈Bl is an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli random
variables with parameter K/M . Hence, by Tchebychev inequality,
Pσ
(∣∣∣ 1
L5
∑
t∈Bl
Xti −K/M
∣∣∣ ≥ 1/L) ≤ 1
L3
.
As a consequence, each player i ∈ NC,1 will be on the punishment phase after Bl with probability
at most 1/L3. Thus, with probability at least 1−M/L3, all players will start blockBl+1 on the main
path. Further, with probability at least 1 −M/L2, all players will be on the main path throughout
the T periods of the repeated game. Since 1 −M/L2 ≥ 1 − ε, the payoffs induced by σ are close
to the target payoff. More precisely, close to 2 for players in ND,2, close to 1 for players in NC,2
and close to 1− 2K/M for players in NC,1. Below, we explicitly compute the payoffs for a player
i ∈ NC,1. We omit the other cases, as they are similar and simpler.
γTi (σ) ≤ (1−
M
L2
) · L
L5
(
− 1 · (KM − 1L) + 1 · (1− KM + 1L)
)
+ L
L(L5 + L)
+ 2 · M
L2
= (1− M
L2
)
L5(1− 2KM + 2L) + L
L5 + L
+
2M
L2
≤ (L
5 + L)(1− 2KM + 2L) + L
L5 + L
+
2M
L2
= 1− 2K
M
+
2
L
+
2M
L2
≤ 1− 2K
M
+ 3ε,
and
γTi (σ) ≥ (1−
M
L2
) · L
L5
(
− 1 · (KM + 1L) + 1 · (1− KM − 1L)
)
+ L
L(L5 + L)
− 1 · M
L2
= (1− M
L2
)
L5(1− 2KM − 2L) + L
L5 + L
− M
L2
≥ L
5(1− 2KM − 2L)
L5 + L
− M
L2
− M
L2
=
(L5 + L)(1− 2KM )− L2KM − 2L4
L5 + L
− M
L2
− M
L2
= 1− 2K
M
− 5ε.
Payoff from deviating from σ. Suppose that some player i ∈ N deviates to τi ∈ σi. All probabil-
ities and expectations here are with respect to P(τi,σ−i).
Case 1. Since 2 is the highest payoff in the game, no deviation by a player inND,2 is profitable.
Case 2. Suppose i ∈ NC,1. Since deviations of player i are immediately detected, no statistical
test is needed. Let Z be the random variable denoting the first payoff block in which player i
defected at some period; if no such block exists, Z = L+ 1. In the latter case, the payoff to player i
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cannot be high:
EP(τi,σ−i)
( 1
T
T∑
t=1
gi(a
t) | Z = L+ 1
)
≤ L
5(1− 2KM ) + 2L
L5 + L
≤ 1− 2K
M
+ 2ε.
In general, at each payoff block before blockZ, the expected payoff of player i is at most 1−2KM +2ε.
Recall thatL has been chosen to ensure that, with probability at least 1−ε, at each block afterBZ , all
players different from player i defect in every period, thus giving a non-positive payoff to player i.
Then, for each z ∈ {1, . . . , L}, EP(τi,σ−i)
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 gi(a
t) | Z = z) is bounded above by
2ε︸︷︷︸
com.
blocks
+(1− ε)
(
2ε︸︷︷︸
no proper
punishment
+(1− ε) 1
L
(
(z − 1)(1− 2K
M
+ 2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocks before
deviation
) + 2︸︷︷︸
dev.
block
+ (L− z)0︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocks after
deviation
))
.
The above expression is maximized for z = L and, therefore,
γTi (τi, σ−i) = EP(τi,σ−i)
( 1
T
T∑
t=1
gi(a
t)
)
≤ 1− 2K
M
+ 8ε.
Case 3. Suppose i ∈ NC,2. Deviations by players in NC,2 may be profitable and hard to detect.
During the first payoff block, B1, all players in N\{i} are on the main path. Thus, players in NC,1
playC1 throughout this block. Let a1i , a
2
i , . . . , a
L5
i be the (possibly random and correlated) sequence
of actions played by i in B1. For the sake of exposition, hereafter we use ati = 1 to denote that i
plays D2 at period t and use ati = 0 otherwise. Fix j ∈ NC,1 and let Xtj be the random variable
such that Xtj = 1 if j has observed D2 at period t, and X
t
j = 0 otherwise. Now, by the strategic
Tchebychev inequality (Lemma 1),30 we have that, for each ε > 0,
P(τi,σ−i)
(∣∣∣ 1
L5
∑
t∈B1
Xtj −
1
L5
∑
t∈B1
(K + ati)
M
∣∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ 1
ε2L5
.
Now, suppose that player i makes a significant profit by deviating at block B1. More precisely,
assume that 1
L5
∑
t∈B1
ati
M ≥ 2/L. By taking ε = 1/L2 in the above equation we get that, with
probability at least 1−1/L, ∣∣ 1
L5
∑
t∈B1 X
t
j − 1L5
∑
t∈B1
(K+ati)
M
∣∣ < 1/L2. Hence, 1
L5
∑
t∈B1 X
t
j ≥
K/M + 2/L − 1/L2 > K/M + 1/L. Therefore, we have shown that, if player i defects at
least 2L4M times during block B1, then, with probability at least 1 − 1/L, player j will be in the
punishment phase at the end ofB1. Therefore, with probability at least (1−1/L)(1−ε) ≥ (1−ε)2,
all players in N\{i} will be in the punishment phase from block B2 onwards.
30We cannot directly apply Tchebychev inequality because the ati actions of player 1 may not be independent of each
other and, thus, the Xtj variables may not be independent either.
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The analysis just done for blockB1 can naturally be applied to any blockBl in which all players
inN\{i} are on the main path. The rest of the argument is similar to the one in Case 2. Let Z be the
random variable denoting the first payoff block in which player i has defected at least 2L4M times;
if no such period exists, Z = L + 1. The expected average payoff to player i in a payoff block
strictly larger than Z is at most 2(1− (1− ε)2) ≤ 4ε. At any block payoff strictly smaller than Z,
his average payoff is not more than 1 + 2L
4M
L5
≤ 1 + 2ε. Given these bounds, the most favorable
case for player i is Z = L and we obtain
γTi (τi, σ−i) ≤ 2ε︸︷︷︸
com.
blocks
+(1− ε) 1
L
(
(L− 1)(1 + 2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocks before
deviation
) + 2︸︷︷︸
dev.
block
)
≤ 1 + 6ε.
We have proved that σ is an 8ε-Nash equilibria of the T -period repeated game with payoff 5ε-close
to the target payoff.
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